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ABSTRACT
This paper draws on the notion of “geopolitical culture” 
as a conceptual tool for understanding debates over the 
formulation of foreign policy in contemporary Russia. To 
draw out the value of this concept, the paper explores the 
symbolism of territory as a means for restoring Russia’s 
status, respect, and power. However, in contrast to previous 
studies, it traces the ways in which a concession of territory 
has been promoted as a device for achieving Russia’s great 
power ambitions. More broadly, the paper seeks to stimulate a 
wider debate on reconceptualizing the relationship between 
territory and identity in Russia, at the same time as it places 
Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands at the heart of debates on 
the spatial imaginaries of the Russian homeland. By drawing 
on and advancing recent theoretical innovations in critical 
geopolitics, and recognizing the significance of the discourse 
of nationalism within these framings, the paper explores 
the nuanced and multiple story lines that constitute Russia’s 
geopolitical culture. Through this approach, intriguing and 
complex plot lines and unexpected twists are revealed, 
which have at times been obscured by nationalist-territorial-
revanchist narratives on Putin’s Russia.  It is suggested that 
such  approaches can also provide insights for interpreting 
cases and contexts beyond Russia and Eurasia.
It is no accident that the Torah calls giving up territory a great sin. Both territory and the 
wealth of the land, people – those all remain the most crucial factors
Vladimir Putin, October 2017
Almost 13 years to the day before the above words, a longstanding dispute 
between Russia and China over a number of islands in the Amur River was finally 
resolved. On October 14, 2004, Russia agreed to concede Tarabarov Island and 
approximately half of Bolshoi Ussuriiskii Island to the People’s Republic of China. 
This was followed a month later by Russia’s foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, suggest-
ing in a TV broadcast that Russia would be prepared to concede a number of small 
islands making up part of the Kuril Islands in return for a peace treaty with Japan. 
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The Russian President, Vladimir Putin, described Lavrov’s interview at the time as 
“very good” and praised the minister of foreign affairs for “expanding the picture 
of our foreign policy priorities” (see Lomanov 2004, 1; “Yapontsam nuzhny” 2004).
This paper  seeks to advance the conceptual frameworks applied to Russian 
geopolitics in order to interrogate the contradictory, complex, and contested 
relationship between territory and identity in contemporary Russia. To achieve 
this, it traces the ways in which the conceptual lens of “geopolitical culture” can 
be developed in order to offer an expanded understanding of Russia’s “prevailing 
sense of identity, place, and mission in the world” (Toal 2017, 39; see also Dijkink 
1996). For Gerard Toal, the idea of geopolitical culture is
[F]irst and foremost about the identity of a territorial entity and the locational narrative it 
presents to itself and the world. Its specification involves boundaries of identity and dif-
ference, the broad civilizational realm within which it positions itself, the states it views 
as friends, and those it differentiates itself from and defines itself against. A geopolitical 
culture, in other words, is made up of a series of geographical imaginations about self 
and other in the world. A geopolitical culture is also about security and defense, about 
whom the territorial entity holds to be its enemies and the strategies it deems necessary 
to preserve its existence, identity, and capacity for maneuver (Toal 2017, 39)
Such an approach has close parallels with social constructivist approaches to 
international relations as well as interpretations of nationalism as discourse 
(Calhoun 1997, 6) and the significance of territory in these discourses (see, for 
example, Anderson 1991; Herb and Kaplan 1999; Johnston, Knight, and Kofman 
2014; Penrose 2002; A. Smith 1999; Yiftachel 2002). In his recent study of a Russia 
“released from the bonds and burdens of Sovietness,” Toal (2017, 64, 70–71) finds 
its geopolitical culture to be formed around specific spatial and existential ques-
tions related to whether Russia is “an empire or a nation-state, a great civiliza-
tion destined to dominate the heart of Eurasia, an imperial motherland that has 
responsibilities to all Russian-speaking peoples, or a state that needs to adjust to 
a postimperial age?”
Drawing on the work of the political scientist, Andrei Tsygankov (2003, 2016), 
and the geographer Graham Smith (1999), Toal (2017) outlines three distinctive 
visions of Russia that have characterized the post-Soviet Russian geopolitical 
culture; namely, a liberal European Russia, a revived imperial Russia, and an 
independent great power Russia. In the first version, Russia is framed as “a 
responsible successor state to the Soviet Union, an international law-abiding 
status quo state […a…] stability-oriented European power” (74). For elements 
of Russia’s elite the demise of the Soviet Union was “a moment when Russia 
could reinvent itself anew as part of a liberal Western ‘civilized world’” (86). In 
contrast, the revived imperial Russia is a “territorially revisionist geopolitical 
fantasy” (76), one that strives to consolidate the former territories of the Russian 
and Soviet empire within a new territorial vision of the homeland. For Toal, the 
third group is defined by a sense of mission fixated on restoring Russia as a 
great power (80).
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It is in this final category that Toal places Putin, who “became Russia’s territo-
rial tough, the man who would reverse its status as a territorial victim” (87). Toal 
offers the term “revanchism” in order to capture Putin’s agenda, as the French word 
“revanche” is “not only associated with the reclamation of lost territories” but also 
a “desire in a competitive game to recover past position, power, and status” (89). 
In an earlier usage, it described the
desire of French state elites, in the wake of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–
1871, to recover the state’s power, honor, and respect. While this restorationist agenda 
found particular expression in their desire to recover the ‘lost territories’ of Alsace and 
parts of Lorraine, it was about much more. The territory became a symbolic object for the 
realization of strength, dignity, and esteem (89, emphasis mine).
This paper challenges such a definition of revanchism for interpreting the Putin 
agenda. It explores the symbolism of territory, but in the sense that a concession of 
territory, rather than a recovery of “lost territories,” can also be framed as a means 
for restoring Russia’s status, respect, and power. In the first instance, it should be 
noted that in all three of the competing visions of Russia sketched above, the coa-
litions of intellectual and political elites that they represent, are invariably striving 
for Russia’s restoration as a great power – whether it be a return to the “civilized” 
world and a seat at the top table of international society in a liberal world order, 
or as a revisionist, expansionist empire. They all seek to enhance Russia’s prestige 
and power in the world, though advocating and rationalizing this from radically 
different ideological positions. Secondly, this paper explores the ways in which 
a concession of territory has been promoted as a means to realize Russia’s great 
power ambitions by representatives of each of the above categories. This fault-
line running across these categories points to a need to reformulate these visions 
with a more nuanced account of the value and symbolism of territory and its role 
in returning Russia to past position, power, and status.
To explore these themes, the first half of this paper draws on a case study of ter-
ritorial concession in the geopolitical vision of a liberal European Russia, followed 
by that of the revived imperial Russia. The second half of this paper questions 
the caricature of Putin as the revanchist politician and territorial nationalist. What 
emerges is a patriotic narrative fused with great power rhetoric, but also a prag-
matic one in that it attempts to fuse together power and principle, location and 
law (see Toal 2017, 21). As explored though the case of the dispute with Japan over 
the Southern Kuril Islands,1 Putin’s "pragmatic patriotic" approach to mediating 
the complexities and tensions in the relationship between territory and identity 
represents part of a wider dialectic strategy to “sublate” certain societal tensions 
(see Brincat 2011, 697; Richardson 2015). This is not to suggest that such a strategy 
has succeeded in producing a rational or progressive synthesis of ideas on Russia’s 
national identity and place in the world, but that it remains a highly contested, 
contradictory, and fluid process. It corresponds with Toal’s (2017, 40) notion of 
geopolitical cultures incorporating competing geopolitical visions, whereby the 
10   P. B. RICHARDSON
one that “predominates and drives state foreign policy is the subject of struggle 
and entrepreneurship in the political arena.” With the vertikal structure of power 
in Russian politics (Monaghan 2012), it also acknowledges how the presidency 
brings with it the “power to creatively synthesize the different traditions in a state’s 
geopolitical culture into specific geopolitical-policy storylines” (Toal 2017, 40).
Taken as as a whole, this paper seeks to stimulate a wider debate on recon-
ceptualizing prevailing understandings of the relationship between territory and 
identity in Russia, at the same time as it places Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands at 
the heart of debates on the spatial imaginaries of the Russian homeland. Using the 
conceptual lens of geopolitical cultures, and recognizing the significance of the 
discourse of nationalism within this framing, it traces the importance of Russia’s 
distant and disputed islands in a geopolitical culture that has been overrepre-
sented – both inside and outside of Russia – by a focus on Europe, the West, and 
post-Soviet space. It argues that Russia’s Far Eastern borderlands, and its relations 
with its neighbors in the region, need to be hard-wired into interpretations of a 
wider geopolitical culture. Through the notion of pragmatic patriotism, it explores 
the ways in which the current leadership has attempted to reconcile competing 
geopolitical visions in order to secure a storyline of Russia’s great power status in 
Europe and Asia.
A new Russia, in a new world
On 25 December 1991 the Soviet flag was lowered over the Kremlin, to be replaced 
by the Russian tricolor. With the formal dissolution of the Soviet Union the follow-
ing day, a new Russia emerged, which now existed at its smallest territorial extent 
since the time of Peter the Great and occupied an area for which there were few 
historical antecedents (O’Loughlin and Talbot 2005, 25). It was a scenario that 
shocked and bewildered many Russians (Dunlop 1997, 49), of which a consider-
able part of the population did not even recognize the boundaries of the current 
territorial state as a legitimate political unit (Kolossov 1999, 74). As Boris Vasilev 
put it in an article published in Sobesednik in August 1992, “Russians have not 
developed into a nation. They never knew where the borders of their state were, 
and they still do not [know]” (cited in Tolz 1992, 3).
It is no coincidence that the early years of the post-Soviet Russian state “were 
dominated by a frenetic production of maps and atlases, seeking to delineate the 
national topography in the public consciousness” (Billé 2014, 170), while popular 
textbooks on geopolitics came to “focus on Russia being thrown back to the bor-
der of pre-Petrine Rus,’ with the impending danger of further contraction” (Suslov 
2013, 25–26). This is a concern that endures to the present, and an article by the 
journalist Oleg Kashin in Slon published in October 2013 noted that
Russia has never existed in the way it is pictured on contemporary maps. [It has] T[u]va 
and Chechnya but no Ukraine and North Kazakhstan – this is like picturing the United 
States with Texas, Hawaii, and Alaska but without Alabama and West Virginia. The 
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Russian border in its present state is ideally suited for debates and fantasies of the “what 
if style” (Kashin 2013).
More liberal-minded commentators have also reflected that, for Russia, “the prob-
lem of space is inseparably linked to and compounded by the problem of identity” 
(Trenin 2001, 26), while Putin has characterized the period after the end of the 
Soviet Union as a moment when the “[e]pedemic of disintegration infected Russia 
itself” (Putin 2005 cited in Toal 2017, 55).
It captured a public mood in which Russia’s redefined “geographical contours 
evoke nothing but a sense of loss” (Suslov 2013, 3), a feeling that was accentuated 
in the early 1990s by an attendant decline in Russia’s geopolitical power, a rap-
idly deteriorating economic situation, and the complete abandonment of state 
ideology. It is in response to these cataclysmic events that there emerged from 
the political and intellectual elite a call for the construction of a distinct “Russian 
idea” that could replace communist ideology and “pull the country together ter-
ritorially, socially, culturally, and morally” (Lynn and Bogorov 1999, 101). As John 
Breuilly (1993, 19) has noted, the rise of nationalism is historically associated with 
“the management of large groups which have suddenly intruded into a previously 
exclusive political arena.” The end of one-party rule demanded an urgent search 
for a state-sponsored narrative that could unite and bind together the territories 
and peoples that made up the new, democratic Russia. In order to fill the vacuum 
left by the once prevailing and supposedly unifying communist ideology, various 
ways of defining Russia and Russians suddenly assumed new relevance and were 
promoted by coalitions of the political and intellectual elite.
Within these definitions there emerged an obsession with territory and iden-
tity which swept up the issue of the Southern Kuril Islands into nationalist poli-
tics and spatial imaginaries of the nation, demonstrating how certain locales can 
lay dormant – latent in the public consciousness – only to become suddenly of 
immense significance for the “nation,” saturated with wider ideological and political 
meaning. An indicator of the way that territory can be divested and invested with 
such significance for nationalist discourses was revealed in a report commissioned 
by the Valdai Discussion Group and published in February 2014, just a month before 
the annexation of Crimea. The report included a poll in which 74% of respondents 
stated that the Kuril Islands were Russian, while only 56% believed that Crimea was 
Russian (Likhachev and Makarov 2014, 23). The poll highlights the fluctuating sym-
bolism of territory and as with Crimea, the Southern Kurils have come to assume 
at certain moments a critical role in defining and articulating the self-image of a 
new Russia, in a new world. It is in this context that a case study of the debates over 
these islands provides a fascinating lens through which to observe new insights 
into competing geopolitical visions of the nation, and the attempts by the Russian 
leadership to co-opt and resolve some of the tensions between them.
By way of background, these islands form the southern part of a volcanic chain 
stretching from the northeast coast of Hokkaido to the southern tip of Kamchatka, 
and are comprised of Iturup, Kunashir, and Shikotan, as well as the rocks and small 
islands that make up the unpopulated Habomai group. From 1855 (when the 
border between Russia and Japan was first formalized) until 1945, the Southern 
Kurils were recognized by both sides as part of Japan. However, after Japan’s defeat 
in the Second World War, Soviet soldiers and citizens began to settle on these 
islands, and by the end of 1948, the last of the Japanese on the islands had been 
deported (Sevela 2001, 75).
Today these islands are claimed by Japan, and referred to collectively as the 
Northern Territories. Perhaps the closest to a compromise on the islands’ future was 
the idea of the transfer of Shikotan and the Habomai Islands, which was proposed 
by the Soviet side in return for a peace treaty. While both parliaments ratified 
a Joint Declaration to this effect in 1956, an exchange of the islands was never 
realized, and today there is still no postwar peace treaty between the two coun-
tries (see, for example, Call 1992; Hasegawa 1998; Kuhrt 2007; Stephan 1974). The 
following section explores how these distant and barren islands came to assume 
critical significance in the competing geopolitical visions and reconfigured spatial 
imaginaries of a new Russia.
“Peking is a friend to us, but Tokyo is dearer”
In the visions of Russia sketched at the start of this paper, Dmitri Trenin, the Director 
of the Carnegie Center, Moscow, is identified in Toal's typologies as a proponent of 
a liberal, Westernizing Russia (Toal 2017, 73). However, in recent years his geopo-
litical orientation has undergone somewhat of an eastward reorientation. Writing 
in 2011, Trenin described in evocative terms what this involved:
Russia’s cutting-edge, twenty-first century frontier lies to the east, where it has both a 
need and a chance to catch up with its immediate Pacific neighbors […] if Peter the 
Great were alive today, he would decamp from Moscow again – only this time to the Sea 
of Japan, not the Baltic. As such Russia would do well to think of Vladivostok as its twenty 
first century capital. It is a seaport, breathing openness (2011, 241).
This vision is one shared by a number of scholars and commentators who urge that 
Russia’s current priority should be a national project to develop Siberia and the 
Far East (see Bordachev and Kanayev 2014). Much of the material and discursive 
energy behind this reorientation towards Asia is a response to a recognition that 
where once the Soviet Union represented the vanguard of modernity – bringing 
electrification, industrial complexes, roads, aviation, and railways across Eurasia 
– in the last few decades it has been Siberia and the Russian Far East which have 
lagged behind the economies of Japan, China, and South Korea.
In order to capture the dynamism and opportunity of this region, some mem-
bers of Russia’s academic, diplomatic, and political elite have privileged the idea of 
developing relations with Japan. From the early 1990s there have been repeated 
declarations that Japan and Russia are “doomed to cooperate” due to the Russian 
economy’s need for technology and investment from Japan, a desire for diversified 
energy supplies in Japan, and a mutual anxiety over the rise of China (Roginko et al. 
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1998). In 2007, Mikhail Kamynin, the then-director of the Ministry of Foreign Affair’s 
department for information and media, acknowledged that “Relations with Japan, 
our Far Eastern neighbor, member of the G8, and one of the largest economies 
in the world, is regarded as a priority direction in Russian foreign policy” (“Glavy 
MID” 2007). While more recently Sergei Karaganov, an advisor to Russia’s first pres-
ident, Boris Yeltsin, and the current honorary chairman Honorary Chairman of the 
Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, has suggested that
[…] if the current economic trends persist, it is very likely that Russia east of the Urals and 
later the whole country will turn into an appendage of China – first as a warehouse of 
resources, and then economically and politically. This will happen without any “aggres-
sive” or unfriendly efforts by China, it will happen by default (Karaganov 2011).
Such anxieties have been voiced over a number of issues concerning China, includ-
ing an unbalanced trade structure (with raw materials heading to China, and fin-
ished goods exported to Russia), China’s lack of major investment in the Russian Far 
East (Tret’yak 2014), limited opportunities for technological transfers, and concern 
over Chinese enterprises hindering competition and adversely affecting Russian 
manufacturers (Kashin 2014, 6). There have also been long-held fears over the 
prospect of Chinese immigration (Sullivan and Renz 2010), with the former pres-
idential representative of the Russian Far East, Konstantin Pulikovskii, stating in 
2000 that he was “disturbed” by the increasing influence of Chinese citizens on 
domestic politics as “facing us across the Amur River is the vastness of China – 1.25 
billion people. And that billion gaze longingly at a fertile, rich, and good land” 
(Rossiiskaya Gazeta, 15 July 2000, cited in Kuhrt 2007, 126). At the regional level, 
a survey of local elites conducted in 2008 by the Institute of History, Archeology, 
and Ethnography in Vladivostok found that half (49%) of respondents viewed “the 
growth of the economic and military power of China” as the greatest danger to 
Russia’s eastern regions (Plaksen 2008), while others have noted the wide-scale 
poaching and illegal export of Russian natural resources to China (Zigan’shin 2008, 
168–170).
In contrast, Japanese activity and investment in projects, enterprises, or busi-
nesses in the Russian Far East is seen as bringing advanced technology, tech-
niques, and practices without large-scale population transfers and a dependency 
on Chinese labor. It is against this background that overcoming the territorial issue 
in order to facilitate Japanese involvement in developing and investing in the Far 
East of Russia has periodically come to the fore. In 2005, Trenin co-authored a 
booklet explicitly setting out his belief that Russia should resolve the dispute over 
the Southern Kurils according to the 1956 formula and the transfer of Shikotan and 
the Habomai Islands (Trenin and Mikheev 2005). He presented a “two-plus alpha” 
formula, where Japan could be offered additional non-territorial incentives, such 
as support for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, cooperation over 
North Korea, support for expanding the role of Japan’s self-defense forces, and 
the development of an East Asian hydrocarbon market (20).
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Trenin restated his proposal in December 2012, again advocating that Russia 
should immediately give up Shikotan and the Habomai (as agreed in 1956), with 
Japan supporting economic activity on the other islands and across Russia, as 
well as establishing a joint economic zone between the two countries (Trenin 
and Weber 2012). However, Trenin now suggested that Russia should also offer 
the remaining two islands, Iturup and Kunashir, which should be integrated into 
Japan within 50 years of signing an agreement (2012). His proposals made no 
plea to overcoming past injustices, but was instead framed solely on pragmatic 
economic, political, and strategic grounds. It was a set of ideas developed from an 
earlier article published in the newspaper Nezavisimaya Gazeta in 2003 under the 
heading “Peking is a Friend to us, But Tokyo is Dearer.” In this article, Trenin sketched 
the logic and rationale of his geopolitical vision and the role it assigned to Japan
[I]n my view, we should bet on Japan as our main partner in the task of modernizing 
Siberia and the Far East. Japan could play here a role similar to that of Germany and 
the European Union in relations with the western regions of Russia. The financial possi-
bilities of Japan, its technological leadership and geopolitical position makes Tokyo an 
appropriate “modernization partner” for Russia in the East. Developing such a partner-
ship with Japan would also contribute to consolidating the position of Russia in Asia as 
a whole (Trenin 2003).
For Trenin, these scraps of territory in the North Pacific are insignificant when com-
pared with the far greater and more pressing task of consolidating and developing 
the Russian Far East. Such a pivotal role for Japan, and the concession of the islands 
in return for re-establishing Russia’s status in Asia, also shares a remarkable and 
perhaps uncomfortable parallel for Trenin with the rehabilitation and reformulation 
of a very different set of ideas associated with Russian Eurasianism.
The term Eurasianism emerged as one of the most popular keywords in “the vol-
atile ideological arsenal of post-Soviet politics,” and although its meaning is highly 
contested and varied, its multiple definitions and movements invariably claim to 
be the heirs to a set of ideas associated with a unique synthesis of European and 
Asian principles originally articulated by a community of Russian émigrés in the 
1920s (Bassin 2007, 279, 281). These individuals constructed a set of scientific and 
ideological arguments to suggest that Russia was a contiguous Eurasian cultural, 
political, and even ethno-linguistic community – “a world unto itself,” and, crucially, 
one distinct from Europe and the West (see Bassin 1991, 14).
Perhaps the most well-known exponent of the “neo-Eurasianism” of post-Soviet 
Russia is the charismatic and idiosyncratic figure of Alexander Dugin, leader of 
the International Eurasian Movement; Head of Conservative Studies at Moscow 
State University (until 2014), and “without doubt post-Soviet Russia’s most prolific 
and well-known geopolitician” (Bassin and Aksenov 2006, 105). Over the last two 
decades, Dugin has come to exercise a “quasi-monopoly” over a certain part of the 
current Russian ideological spectrum and has frequently boasted of his contacts 
with presidential advisors and deputies in the State Duma (Laruelle 2012, 107). He 
sees the world through a grand “civilizational” prism, where great powers compete 
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against each other in a struggle for space, spheres of influence, and survival. It is 
a brand of Eurasianism marked by a virulent anti-Westernism in which Russia’s 
destiny is to be the guarantor of distinct civilizational values across Eurasia’s con-
tinental space (see Laruelle 2012, 115–120).
In the competing geopolitical visions of Russia outlined earlier, Dugin is rec-
ognized by Toal (2017, 73, 76) as an intellectual proponent of an imperial Russia, 
promoting a “‘new order’ of space, identity, and power in Russia.” As part of a strug-
gle to assert Russia’s hegemony over Eurasia, Dugin has proposed building an axis 
to resist Atlanticist influences (Tsygankov 2003, 109). In his Eurasianist fantasy, 
Russia’s continental destiny is to ally itself in Asia, with Japan, which alongside 
Russia, Germany, and Iran would form part of a “confederation of large spaces,” with 
each understood as a quasi-empire that dominates its corresponding civilizational 
area (Dugin 2000, 247 cited in Laruelle 2012, 117). These visions of expansionist 
Eurasianism assign to East Asia a strictly instrumental role based on a dichotomous 
worldview of Eurasian land power, led by Russia, against the West (Rangsimaporn 
2006, 380). It is within this geopolitical meta-narrative that Dugin sees the pos-
sibility of transferring the Southern Kurils in exchange for assistance in resisting 
Chinese expansionism into Siberia and the Russian Far East, as well as releasing 
Japan from its American domination. In 2004 in Russia’s most popular news weekly, 
Argumenty i Fakty, he carefully summarized this position:
With the question of the Kuril Islands we have a matter with a very delicate geopolitical 
situation […] In the future Russian-Japanese relations can become the key for the mod-
ernization of the Russian economy and a counter-measure to the demographic expan-
sion of China in Siberia. Therefore Russia is interested in an exchange of the islands for 
a geopolitical union. […] In a terrible dream, the United States again sees the strength-
ening of the strategic axis of Moscow and Tokyo. But if Russia “simply” sets off along the 
Gorbachev route and begins to squander its lands for a pittance, and sometimes simply 
for the smile of foreign leaders, it will be a manifest failure. Our conditions must be the 
withdrawal of Tokyo from the American zone of strategic control and the removal of the 
American bases on Okinawa (Koshkin and Dugin 2004).
Dugin articulates a grand geopolitical bargain in order to secure the vast spaces of 
Siberia which is in marked contrast to other advocates of a reconstituted imperial 
Russia – such as Dmitri Rogozin (deputy prime minister for the defense and space 
industry, and a former leader of the nationalist party Rodina), Sergei Glaz’ev (for-
merly a duma deputy for Rodina and its leader, and currently an advisor to Putin), 
Vladimir Zhirinovsky (leader of the right-wing Liberal Democratic Party of Russia), 
and Gennady Zyuganov (leader of the Communist Party of Russia) – who have 
all been unwavering in their resistance to any concession of territory to Japan 
(see “Deputaty ne Soglasny” 2004; Tsyganok 2004; Zilanov and Plotnikov 2001). 
However, for Dugin the islands are insignificant compared with the necessity of 
deflecting China away from Russia, stating that “My Eurasian solution for China is 
southern expansion, in the direction of Australia, [to] the Pacific Ocean – it is not 
our problem what [the] local population will think” (Dugin 2008). It is a statement 
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that vividly captures the essence of Dugin’s geopolitical logic and the imperial 
prism of domination and subordination through which he perceives the world. 
In his Great Power politics, Russia’s Eurasian heartland must be protected against 
what he interprets as China’s “demographic expansion to the north […and, for 
this reason] we need some help from the Japanese (2008).” Ultimately, the loss 
of the Kurils are part of an ambitious gambit to secure a resurgent, assertive, and 
expansive Eurasian Russia, though Dugin underscores that the trade of territory 
cannot be for any material gain, but rather an exchange for something altogether 
more priceless:
[I]t is completely excluded to exchange this for money or some material because it is 
considered to be a moral case, so we could exchange [one] moral case for another moral 
case […] the return of Greater Russia to the [global] scheme […] We could explain why 
we give for example our territory to China, Japan, Europe (in the case of Kaliningrad dis-
trict) in exchange for our greatness, our return to greatness. It is difficult but it is possible. 
It is completely impossible to explain [this] in exchange for some material reward […] 
they have no price […] they are moral symbols (2008).
In Dugin’s geopolitics, any concession of these “moral symbols” could only be in 
exchange for consolidating Russia’s hold on Eurasia, keeping at bay the demo-
graphic and economic expansion of China, and resisting what he sees as America’s 
containment and subordination of Russia. No matter how implausible his geopo-
litical imaginings appear, Dugin remains a visible and connected public figure. 
Although after extremely controversial and inflammatory statements supporting 
pro-Russian separatists in Ukraine his access to television appearances was cur-
tailed in August 2014, he continues to harbor an obvious desire – through his 
political movement, as well as his manipulation of online and traditional media – to 
consolidate his imperial vision of Eurasianism into the wider public and political 
consciousness. While Trenin once referred to Dugin as a “very well-read and pro-
lific crackpot with a lot of influence” (Clover 2000), on the issue of the Southern 
Kurils, both have put forward a similarly pragmatic proposal for restoring Russia’s 
status and power in Europe and Asia. As representatives drawn from competing 
geopolitical visions of a new Russia, they have nevertheless arrived at the same 
point – placing an instrumental value on territory and the possibility of exchang-
ing the Southern Kurils in return for developing the Russian Far East and Russia’s 
return to the global scheme.
Putin’s pragmatic patriotism
The second part of this article examines how the Russian leadership creatively 
synthesizes different traditions in Russia’s geopolitical culture into a specific geopo-
litical-policy storyline (see Toal 2017, 40). In the typologies sketched at the outset, 
Putin is categorized by Toal as a political proponent of Russia as an independent 
great power with its emphasis on territorial integrity and state strengthening (72-
73). The remainder of this paper explores the ways in which the Southern Kurils 
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have featured in Putin's negotiation and mediation of competing geopolitical 
visions and his emergence as a “pragmatic patriot.” It suggests that Putin's behavior 
is attributable to a dialectic approach to world politics which has resulted in him  
becoming the only post-Soviet leader to publically countenance a transfer of the 
Southern Kurils to Japan. This has occurred at the same time as the president has 
deployed an effective strategy for limiting any damage to his nationalist credentials 
by periodically activating a national-patriotic narrative on the immutable nature of 
Russia’s territory and borders which were fixed as a result of the Second World War.
On November 14, 2004, just months after Putin’s landslide re-election as presi-
dent with over 70% of the vote, came a surprise announcement on national TV by 
Russia’s foreign minister. In this announcement Lavrov declared that Russia was 
willing to accept the principles of the 1956 Joint Declaration between the Soviet 
Union and Japan, and as a continuator state to the Soviet Union, Russia would 
recognize this agreement as in existence and allow for the transfer of Shikotan 
and the Habomai Islands as stipulated in the 1956 agreement if a peace treaty was 
agreed (NTV, November 14 2004 cited in “Na Sakhaline” 2004). While the idea of 
recognizing the joint declaration may not have been new to Russian and Japanese 
negotiators, it represented the first time that a territorial concession had been pro-
posed on nationwide television and directed towards a mass audience in Russia. 
Putin himself praised Lavrov’s TV interview, while ITAR-TASS reported the president 
as stating that “We have always fulfilled and will fulfill all obligations taken upon 
ourselves, especially ratified documents […]” (November 15, 2004, cited on “Na 
Sakhaline” 2004; and Lomanov 2004, 1).
Lavrov also used the moment of his announcement to touch on the perceived 
success of the final demarcation of the Russian–Chinese border. In October 2004, 
the longstanding dispute over islands in the Amur River was finally resolved when 
Russia agreed to concede to China Tarabarov Island, and approximately 50% of 
Bolshoi Ussuriiskii Island. Lavrov suggested that Russia had lost nothing in deciding 
this problem: “There was no talk about the return of the islands to China. What 
was talked about was that for the first time in the history of Russian and Chinese 
relations the territorial problem was settled” (“Lavrov” 2004).
Unfortunately for the Russian side, the day after Lavrov's announcement, on 
November 15, Japan’s Cabinet Secretary, Hiroyuki Hosoda, dismissed the Russian 
foreign minister’s proposal as nothing new, while Junichiro Koizumi, reaffirmed 
his position that a peace treaty would only follow the return of all the islands 
(Buszynski 2006, 158). In marked contrast to his previous flexibility on the issue, 
Putin expressed his frustration less than a year later when he declared in his “Direct 
Line” with the Russian public on September 27, 2005, that
With regard to the negotiation process with Japan on the Kurils – the four islands – […] 
are under the sovereignty of the Russian Federation. It is enshrined in international law. 
It is one of the results of the Second World War. And on this point, we are not prepared 
to discuss anything (“Putin na linii” 2005).
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He returned to the theme in June 2007, when he reiterated that “we don’t see 
them as ‘disputed’ since this situation emerged as a result of the Second World War 
and was fixed by international law in international documents” (Sarkisov 2009, 48). 
This animation of tropes surrounding the inviolability of Russia’s postwar borders 
served to deflect attention from the failure of the 2004 initiative. It demonstrated 
the remarkable ability of the Russian leadership to pick up and then discard a 
certain set of ideas on territory, borders, and identity depending on which ones 
appeared to be the most appropriate and timely for legitimating and justifying 
their actions and initiatives.
However, despite the two sides appearing to be “stuck in diametrically opposed 
positions” (Fesyun 2007, 5), a compromise close to the 1956 agreement has perhaps 
never been off the table for Russia. In 2005, the then-Counselor of the Embassy 
of Russia in Japan, Mikhail Galuzin, reiterated in Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn’ that the 
1956 Joint Declaration, including the transfer of Habomai and Shikotan, “is for us an 
active judicial document” (Galuzin 2005, 92). While in 2009, Konstantin Sarkisov (a 
former advisor to the last leader of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev) suggested 
that, in private conversations, Putin has several times indicated that because the 
1956 Joint Declaration was ratified by both Parliaments it became law (2009, 40).
More recently, Putin also revealed a new rhetorical refinement of his strategy, 
when, on March 1, 2012, just days before his return as Russia’s president, he signaled 
that negotiations with Japan over the islands could be restarted. With a black belt 
in judo, Putin employed terminology from the sport, stating that “We don’t have 
to achieve victory. In this situation, we have to reach an acceptable compromise. 
That would be like a ‘hikiwake’ [draw]” (Soejima and Komaki 2012). Enthusiasm 
for improving relations with Japan appeared to be gaining further momentum 
in the run-up to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit held in 
Vladivostok in September 2012. With the idea of a political and economic “pivot” 
towards the Asia-Pacific region emerging in the agenda of the Russian Government 
(Bordachev and Kanayev 2014), Lavrov met with his Japanese counterpart, Koichiro 
Gemba, in Sochi in July 2012, and after the meeting Lavrov specifically highlighted 
how “both sides realize the necessity to make a strong [emphasis on] moderniza-
tion, innovation, energy and investment components” (Lavrov 2012).
In April 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Putin discussed Japan’s 
participation in a project by Russia’s Gazprom to connect its eastern Siberian gas 
fields to a liquefied natural gas (LNG) export hub near Vladivostok (Manthorpe 
2013). At the meeting, Putin also expressed his hope that this agreement and a host 
of others would lead to Japanese investment in agriculture and forestry, as well as 
in regional transportation projects (2013). In addition, they issued a joint statement 
at the end of their meeting, declaring that “The leaders of both countries agreed 
that the situation where, 67 years after the conclusion of [World War II], we have 
still been unable to conclude a bilateral peace treaty, looks abnormal” (Weir 2013).
It was also agreed that the Russian and Japanese foreign ministries would “inten-
sify contacts with an aim to developing a mutually acceptable plan” and that this 
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plan would prioritize two parallel processes on the “discussion of the main subjects 
of the peace agreement and, simultaneously, ways to actively promote improve-
ments across the full range of Russian-Japanese relations” (Weir 2013). This new 
impetus was quickly demonstrated when in November 2013 the first “two-plus-
two” meeting of the foreign and defense ministers of Japan and Russia was held in 
Tokyo. Such a format – usually reserved for close allies (Hill 2013) – was indicative 
of the Russian leadership’s active interest in developing relations with Japan in 
order to achieve its economic development and security ambitions.
These initiatives were followed by another meeting between Putin and Abe on 
February 7, 2014, around the time of the opening ceremony of the Sochi Winter 
Olympics. In the midst of a boycott by Western leaders, Abe was conspicuous by 
his presence at the ceremony, with Putin heralding the progress between the two 
sides, declaring that “We have seen a good environment created that could help 
resolve the most difficult problem in bilateral relations” (Heritage and Anishchuk 
2014). However, the days after the Sochi Olympics suddenly transformed Russia’s 
international relations. The annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and support for 
separatists in Eastern Ukraine led to a dramatic worsening of Russia’s relationship 
with the West. Japan also suspended talks with Moscow over easing visa restric-
tions, promoting investment, space cooperation, and issued a list of individuals 
from Russia and Ukraine with asset freezes and travel bans (“Japan Puts Russian 
Sanctions” 2014). On May 21, 2014, these sanctions were followed by the signing 
of a huge deal to export Russian gas to China at a reported $400 billion over 
30 years. Additional contracts and memoranda of intent on Chinese investment 
were also signed in areas such as coal, copper ore, liquefied natural gas, as well as 
the production of construction materials, petrochemicals, and machine building 
(Kashin 2014, 6).
Although Putin stressed that the prioritization of China in Russia’s development 
strategy was not a reaction to events in Ukraine and the imposition of sanctions 
(Shimotomai 2014), the May 2014 gas deal appeared to herald a sudden recon-
figuration of Russia’s geopolitical culture. Just months before his assassination in 
February 2015, Boris Nemtsov (2014), a political opponent and vocal critic of Putin, 
had responded to this turn to China stating that
The Crimean adventure has one fateful consequence for Russia […] In terms of the econ-
omy, Russia is now entirely in the hands of the Chinese communists. And their position 
is well known – Russia is a backward country – a raw materials appendage, which will 
supply us with cheap gas and cheap oil.
With Putin declaring in 2014 that China had become Russia’s “natural ally” (Fang 
2014), on January 20, 2015, Japanese minister of foreign affairs, Fumio Kishida, 
stated in a speech in Brussels, that “what is happening in Ukraine, it is changing 
the status quo by means of force, the problem of the Northern Territories (was) 
also a change of the situation by means of force” (“Strel’tsov” 2015). In response, 
in May 2015, Lavrov again related the destiny of the Kurils to the Second World 
War, this time stating that “We refer [Japan] back to the UN Charter, and here they 
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cannot have any objection, and we can say that Japan is the only country which 
questions the results of the Second World War, nobody else does this” (Lavrov 
cited in Dolgopolov and Shestakova 2015). Shortly after this statement, a series 
of high-profile visits also took place across the disputed islands, including one by 
Russia's Prime Minister, Dmitri Medvedev (“Japan Protests” 2015).
During 2015, it appeared that the space for a solution of the Southern Kuril 
issue had become narrower than ever. It represented a time when Putin’s broader 
attempts to mediate, negotiate, and blend competing streams of thought within 
society on Russia’s national identity and destiny appeared to be faltering in the 
face of a nationalist fervor around Crimea (see Blakkisrud 2016; Laruelle 2015; 
Marten 2015; Rogoża 2014; Teper 2016; Tsygankov 2015). Yet, in relations with 
Japan, the pragmatic side of Putin’s patriotism appears to have endured, and it 
remains significant that Putin – unlike Medvedev and other senior members of 
his government – has never once visited any of the disputed islands. It serves to 
demonstrate to the Japanese side that any alternative to Putin’s solution on the 
islands’ future could be far worse. It is also telling that Abe has maintained regular 
and personal contact with Putin, and their meeting at the second East Economic 
Forum, held in Vladivostok in September 2016, represented the 12th bilateral sum-
mit since Abe took office in December 2012. At the Forum, Abe offered concrete 
plans to implement the eight points of economic cooperation first discussed with 
Putin in Sochi in May and included proposals for significant investment into critical 
sectors in the Russian Far East, ranging from infrastructure to energy (Walker and 
Azuma 2016).
Putin also made an official visit to Japan at the end of 2016, which included 
a meeting in Abe’s home district of Yamaguchi in mid-December 2016. The visit 
saw the signing of more than 60 deals in which it was suggested that Japanese 
investments would amount to over $2.5 billion (“Russia, Japan” 2016). On the terri-
torial issue, an agreement for joint economic activities on the Southern Kurils was 
also reached, while the “two-plus-two” format of meetings between foreign and 
defense ministers was re-established after its suspension following the annexation 
of Crimea. The summit appeared to have ended in favor of Russia, with Abe facing 
domestic criticism for what were perceived as his concessions to Russia (Mie 2016; 
Suslina 2016). Sixty years after the 1956 Joint Declaration, it offered a tantalizing 
suggestion that Putin’s patient and pragmatic patriotism was paying dividends. 
In his fusion of competing geopolitical visions on Russia’s national destiny, the 
terms of the debate on Russia in Asia had markedly shifted with the emergence 
of a storyline that accentuates the role of Asia in Russia’s geopolitical culture and 
is framed around consolidating Russia’s great power ambitions, even if it involves 
the cost of a concession of territory. This case-study of Russia’s distant and dis-
puted islands brings into focus more nuanced and multiple storylines on Russia’s 
geopolitical culture. They reveal intriguing and complex plot lines and unexpected 
twists that prevailing nationalist-territorial-revanchist accounts of Putin’s Russia 
have often obscured.
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Conclusion
This paper has explored how the current Russian leadership has synthesized var-
ious tropes and imaginaries on Russia’s place in the world in order to arrive at the 
notion of a concession of territory that can help to realize higher national and 
geopolitical goals. It is indicative of a geopolitical culture that brings together a 
host of ideological power networks, which have been instrumental in generat-
ing cultural and civilizational discourses (see Toal 2017, 40). Such a process fuses 
together elements of the economic power networks that support modernization 
and accumulation-centric discourses, as well as incorporating security discourses 
that are structured around perceived threats to the state (40), in this case from both 
the West and China. In reformulating prevailing readings of Russia’s geopolitical 
culture, this paper has highlighted the role of the Far East and recognized how 
the competing geopolitical visions that constitute this culture are informed by a 
mutual striving for great power status, which simultaneously works to continually 
reconfigure and negotiate the fraught relationship between territory, identity, 
and borders in contemporary Russia. Such a reconceptualization of geopolitical 
cultures, and its emphasis on the fluctuating and contested values placed on ter-
ritory, also has relevance in other contexts and locales, perhaps most notably and 
recently when India and Bangladesh officially exchanged their border enclaves in 
the summer of 2015 (see Shewly 2017).
In the Russian case, the announcement on national television in November 
2004 that the Russian Government may be prepared to give up a piece of sov-
ereign territory, gained as result of the Second World War – the high-water mark 
of Russia and the Soviet Union’s geopolitical status and spatial extent – was an 
extraordinary moment and the apogee of a sea change in Russian politics and 
presidential power. It placed an instrumental value on the nature of territory, and 
the Southern Kurils’ transfer to Japan was represented as a chance to enhance 
Russia’s security and unlock the economic development of the Far East and Siberia. 
Seen through the geopolitical visions of Trenin and Dugin, the exchange of these 
islands would permit Russia to increase its presence and potential in the region. 
Although the architects of these proposals were from polar opposites of the ide-
ological spectrum, neither framed it as a concession to overcome the Soviet past, 
but rather as an evocative and bold appeal for reinstating Russia as a Great Power 
in Europe and Asia.
Putin’s consolidation of power and apparent ideological flexibility have brought 
with it opportunities for fusing together competing geopolitical visions and their 
spatial imaginaries into a form of pragmatic patriotism. It is a  dialectic appeal 
towards co-opting various constellations of the elite, and one which has not been 
restricted to the Southern Kurils. Putin has also countenanced territorial compro-
mises with China in the Amur River (2004), a border demarcation with Kazakhstan 
(2005), and the agreement of a fifty-fifty split to resolve a disputed maritime zone 
in the Barents Sea with Norway (2010). Yet, this is the same leader who denounced 
EURASIAN GEOGRAPHY AND ECONOMICS  21
U.S. foreign policy at the 2007 Munich Security Conference, led Russia into conflict 
with Georgia over the breakaway territory of South Ossetia in summer 2008, and 
annexed Crimea in March 2014. These were moments of patriotic and national-
ist fervor, but they were also a reaction to where Putin's security, economic, and 
geopolitical objectives had failed.
The ink on the caricatures of Putin’s obsession with national territory becomes 
somewhat blurred on closer examination. Such caricatures obscure the ways in 
which the Russian leadership has at times proved to be adept at co-opting and 
synthesizing competing and contradictory understandings of territory and iden-
tity through geopolitical storylines. There is a certain duality and dialectic quality 
to this ability to pick up or discard whichever version best suits the prevailing 
economic and geopolitical circumstances. Although the discursive distinction 
between patriot and pragmatist has at times been difficult to discern, fractures 
emerge in Putin’s revanchist tendencies when he proposes a concession of territory 
in exchange for enhanced prestige, power, and status. Whether Putin can continue 
to negotiate and mediate this duality in his pragmatic patriotism will determine 
not only the future of the Southern Kurils, but also his own future and with it the 
destiny of Russia.
Note
1.  The “Southern Kurils” correspond with Japan’s claim on the “Northern Territories,” which 
represent the islands of Kunashir, Shikotan, Iturup, and the Habomai Islands. As the 
sources of this research are primarily in Russian, the Russian terms for these islands are 
used throughout, though this is not intended to privilege the Russian claim.
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